



**REPORT
OF
THE WORKSHOP OF SECRETARIES GENERAL OF
GOVERNING FORMER LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
OF SOUTHERN AFRICA
ON
THE CURRENT COMMON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC
AND SECURITY CHALLENGES THEY FACE**

VENUE: VICTORIA FALLS, ZIMBABWE

DATES: 4TH TO 8TH MAY 2016

1.0 Introduction

1.1 The Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) hosted a workshop of the Secretaries General of the governing Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa at the Elephant Hills Hotel, in Victoria Falls, from 4th to 8th May 2016.

1.2 The workshop was held pursuant to the mandate given to the Secretaries General by the last Summit of Heads of Political Parties of Southern African Liberation Movements which was held in Maputo on 20th November 2015. Its agenda, therefore, took into account and explored more deeply and holistically the six common challenges identified by that Summit as facing governing Former Liberation Movements (FLMS) in Southern Africa.

THE SIX COMMON CHALLENGES

- ☞ Factionalism.
- ☞ Lack of patriotism/commitment to Party and Country.
- ☞ NGOs, CSOs and FBOs acting as force-multipliers for Opposition.
- ☞ External interference in electoral processes.
- ☞ Opposition aligned media.
- ☞ Foreign interference using hard and soft power

1.3 Secretaries General of all the six governing Former Liberation Movements in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, each heading a strong entourage, attended the meeting. Secretaries General Comrade Juliao Mateus Paulo “Dino Matrosse” led the delegation of the MPLA, Cde Eliseu Machava the FRELIMO delegation, Cde Nangolo Mbumba the SWAPO Party delegation, Cde Gwede Mantashe the ANC delegation, Cde Abdulhraman Kinana the

CCM delegation and Cde Ignatius Morgen Chiminya Chombo the ZANU PF delegation.

- 1.4 ZANU PF presided over the proceedings of the Victoria Falls meeting from 4th – 8th May 2016.
- 1.5 The workshop listened to detailed presentations from each of the six Secretaries General on the challenges being faced by each governing Former Liberation Movement. This was followed by detailed commentary and discussion, which helped to isolate the common threats, before agreeing on a set of recommendations on common strategies going forward.
- 1.6 This report captures and presents the salient points of the deliberations and recommendations of the meeting for the esteemed consideration of the Summit of Heads of Political Parties of Southern African Former Liberation Movements.

2.0 The Preponderance of the Regime Change Threat

- 2.1 The workshop agreed that **regime change** is the primary and perhaps the most urgent common threat facing the governing Former Liberation Movements for now and the foreseeable future. The workshop agreed with the Russians and Chinese characterisation of regime change converge as **the increasingly widespread Western practice of overthrowing legitimate political authorities by provoking internal instability and conflict against governments that are considered**

inconvenient or insubordinate to their interests, replacing them with pliant puppet regimes that then pander to their interests.

- 2.2 According to research and intelligence analysis that informed the presentations of the Former Liberation Movements, Western interests in Southern Africa seek to establish military domination, including military bases within the region, as an option for rapid escalation to hard power where soft power would have failed in pursuit of regime change. The West wants unfettered access and control of Southern Africa's over 200 million-strong population as a captive market, its 10 million square kilometre landmass, its strategic east-west sea routes, its vastly diverse and unique mineral, gas and natural resources endowment, its organic agricultural potential that is second to none in the world, its high quality human capital, as well as its unparalleled clement and friendly climatic and weather conditions.
- 2.3 This sets them at variance and on collision course with the resource nationalisation such as ZANU PF is championing through its Land Reform and Resettlement Programme, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment in Zimbabwe and other socialisation models that are being pursued by the other Former Liberation Movements. It also collides with all the other aspects of the **revolutionary change** that the Former Liberation Movements are championing and enforcing in various stages and phases of their transition from the colonial repressive order that was overthrown at independence to new national democratic societies anchored in the ideologies, objectives and ethos of their Liberation Struggles.

- 2.4 The meeting singled out the USA as the lead country in the international regime change agenda. Within Southern Africa, the meeting traced the origins of regime change, which is epitomised by the protracted assault on Zimbabwe since 1999, to United States interests in Southern Africa since the mid-1970s. Richard Nixon's National Security Memorandum No.39 proposed closer cooperation with the minority white regimes that were then in power, with then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger emphatically upholding the centrality of whites in any political dispensation emerging in Southern Africa. Kissinger asserted in the Memorandum, **"the whites are here (Southern Africa) to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is through them"**.
- 2.5 Robert Cooper, Foreign Affairs Advisor to British Prime Minister Tony Blair, wrote in support of Western imperialism in Southern Africa, **"The challenge to the postmodern world is to get used to the idea of double standards. Among ourselves (West), we operate on the basis of laws and open cooperative security. But when dealing with more old fashioned kinds of states outside the postmodern continent of Europe, we need to revert to the rougher methods of an earlier era-force, pre-emptive attack, deception and whatever is necessary to deal with those who still live in the nineteenth century world of every state for itself. Among ourselves we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle, we must also use the laws of the jungle"**.
- 2.6 The above Western strategic postulates, by and large, manifested in the birth in 1983 of regime change. According to important insights

attributed to one Eva Golinger, regime change is the strategy of overthrowing socialist-inclined, anti-imperialist and inconvenient governments in nations that are perceived as being insubordinate to Western interests, this being done under the guise of promoting democracy. Through the creation of a series of quasi-private pseudo foundations, such as Britain's Westminster Foundation, the US's Albert Einstein Institute (AEI), the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the International Republican Institute (IRI), the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Freedom House and the International Centre for Non-Violent Conflict (ICNC) and Germany's Frederick Ebert-Stiftung (FES) Foundation to launder funding and strategic aid to political parties, NGOs, student organisations and other civil society groups abroad that promote the West's agenda in targeted countries under the guise of 'strengthening democratic institutions'. Since 1992, Central Asia, Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union, and Southern Africa, have been declared the main targets of these Western regime change initiatives.

- 2.7 The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), under the International Counterinsurgency Initiative of 2009, is the principal agency that promotes the strategic and economic interests of the USA across the globe as part of a new counter insurgency doctrine. The main avenues through which funds are filtered to destabilise target countries are the transition initiatives, reconstruction, conflict management, economic development, governance and democracy departments of USAID.

- 2.8 With hindsight, the workshop noted that this was the context in which the successor Carter Administration, after Richard Nixon, discouraged revolutionary change in Southern Africa and the Reagan Administration, in turn, also introduced the Constructive Engagement Policy, spearheaded by former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, which, with full backing of Britain, sought to protect US interests in Southern Africa. Fast forward to today, this also remains the context in which the West has and continues to actively discourage, even oppose, revolutionary change in the region with British backing, through various quid pro quos they execute across the globe. In Zambia, the United National Independence Party (UNIP) was overthrown into political oblivion by the Solidarity type labour based Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD).
- 2.9 This, therefore, poses a continuing threat to any revolutionary change like the one the ANC is pursuing in post-apartheid South Africa since 1994. Those who stand to lose their colonial privileges tend to gang together, with the support of their international allies, to frustrate, subvert and ultimately overthrow the new order which they perceive as a direct challenge to their privileges and interests. Zimbabwe, having endured a virulent, sustained and unrelenting regime change assault since 1999, has been more or less the laboratory, and ZANU PF the guinea pig, in which the West has developed and tested all aspects of regime change variants of which it is now visiting upon virtually all the Former Liberation Movements of Southern Africa. In Zimbabwe, this onslaught's objective is to remove ZANU PF from power and replace it with a puppet regime that will be pliant in reversing the gains of the

Liberation Struggle, not least the Government's Land Reform, Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Programmes.

- 2.10 From an analysis of the experiences of Georgia's "Rose Revolution" (2003), Ukraine's "Orange Revolution" (2004), Kirgizstan's "Tulip Revolution" (2005), Serbia, Yugoslavia, Venezuela, Granada, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, the so-called Arab Spring in Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt, as well as the ongoing Western interventions in Syria and Yemen and Zimbabwe's epic resistance of the past 16 years, the meeting concluded that regime change, as currently perfected, enjoys unlimited capacity for escalation. At the bottom of this escalation ladder lies '**soft power**'. Soft power involves the creation and provision of support to generally anti-Communist, anti-socialist, pro-capitalist and pro-imperialist movements in target countries. It also involves concerted moves aimed at subverting democratic processes and negatively exploiting the constitutional order in the target country.
- 2.11 The battery of tactical adjuncts available to soft power include economic strangulation of target economies through declared and undeclared sanctions, destabilisation and neutralisation of security forces, stigmatisation and demonization of targeted political parties and their leaders, negative media onslaughts that are now referred to as "perception management operations", youth exchange programmes under so-called democracy and good governance programmes, incessant premeditated contestations of electoral outcomes by losing opposition formations and their civil society adjuncts, subversion and infiltration of ruling parties and their governments, #tag campaigns under various pretexts on social media such as the #ZumaMustFall and #FeesMustFall

campaigns targeting the ANC in South Africa, as well as externally foisted unity governments.

2.12 In Zimbabwe, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), which later split into four permutations led by Morgan Tsvangirai (MDC-T), Welshman Ncube (MDC-N), Tendai Biti (MDC-Renewal) and Job Sikala (MDC-99), was originally created by the British Government, through the Westminster Foundation, in 1999 as the prime internal adjunct and Trojan Horse for its regime change strategy in Zimbabwe. The workshop identified early manifestations of regime change in Southern Africa in the West's support to apartheid South Africa's total strategy and its destabilisation of the Frontline States, the sponsoring of the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) as a ploy to prevent the MPLA from assuming and retaining power, the joint South African and Rhodesian support for the creation and sustainment of RENAMO in Mozambique.

2.13 The workshop drew further analogies of regime change manifestation in the intermittent resurgence of RENAMO banditry in Mozambique, the emergence of Democratic Alliance (DA) and Economic Freedom Front (EFF) in South Africa ostensibly spurred by the Marikana incident, as well as similar experiences against CCM through CHADEMA in Tanzania, and SWAPO through DTA and other opposition pretenders in Namibia.

2.14 The architects of regime change also create a plethora of foreign directed and funded NGOs, which act as Trojan horses, storm troopers

and force multipliers for their subversive agenda in targeted countries. For example, between 1980 and 2000 Zimbabwe had just under 140 NGOs dealing with important social issues such as HIV/AIDS prevention, food relief, leprosy eradication and other needs of vulnerable groups in society. From the advent of regime change in 1999, the number of NGOs surged to over 4000 focusing on governance, rule of law, human rights, electoral reform and democracy advocacy amongst many other political initiatives.

2.15 **“Colour” or “coloured” revolution** constitutes the primary weapon of soft power. This escalates the protest movement from a focus on service delivery issues, a law before parliament or other tactical concerns over corruption or HIV/AIDS to new tendencies of directly challenging state power or provoking the security forces of a target state, its police or army, into violent confrontation like what happened at Marikana.

2.16 The meeting heard that ZANU PF saw and endured all aspects of soft power over the past 16 years. On the economic front, the West went on to impose declared and undeclared illegal economic sanctions against Zimbabwe. In urging the US to support sanctions against Zimbabwe, Chester Crocker stated, **“To separate the Zimbabwean people from ZANU PF, we are going to have to make their economy scream, and I hope you, senators, have the stomach for what you have to do”**.

2.17 These sanctions then hindered and prevented full economic recovery and growth, caused astronomical inflation, precipitated critical shortage

of goods and services, thus bringing about untold suffering amongst the population, which translated into the protest vote against ZANU PF in March 2008. This was aided quite significantly by foreign sponsored internal Third Force within ZANU PF which plotted to have the President voted out in the belief of then forming a coalition government with opposition formations, in 2008 and again ahead of the Party Congress of 2014.

- 2.18 The meeting also heard that where soft power fails, the West has not usually hesitated to escalate to hard power. In 2008, for example, Britain's initiative aimed at escalating the assault on Zimbabwe to **hard power** through a UN Security Council Resolution only floundered through the double Sino-Russian veto in July 2008. Former Liberation Movements exhibited unity and solidarity in support of the veto.
- 2.19 The Secretaries General, therefore, agreed that regime change was the main common threat to all of them which required urgent and focused counter strategies. There is a symbiotic relationship which makes it impossible to separate the external threats from the internal threats because the two dimensions direct, nourish and sponsor each other.

3.0 Other Common Threats

- 3.1 The Secretaries General isolated and discussed the following threats as subservient and subsidiary to regime change:

- 3.1.1 Corruption. The meeting agreed that rampant corruption is seriously damaging the images of the Former Liberation

Movements and their Governments. This is causing the electorate to lose faith in their elected representatives and the Party which sponsored them. Corruption manifests in two forms, the first being 'state capture' where bureaucrats in government offer business deals to a few companies which in turn give them kickbacks. The end result is that the companies become huge oligarchies powerful enough to discipline the state and determine State and Party deployments. These companies also sponsor candidates as well as eliminate any candidates that may seem to challenge their preferred candidates and their interests. The second form is corporate capture where a company sponsors a candidate in an election campaign in return for business deals once the candidate is appointed into a Ministerial position in government. These companies also fund the use of dirty tricks against any fellow Party cadres deemed to be a threat to the winning prospects of their preferred candidates. Secretaries General also expressed concern over the use of money by Party leaders who manipulate internal democratic processes, which ultimately feeds into the vicious cycle of factionalism. The Secretaries General also expressed grave concern with the other forms of corruption such as rampant abuse of public office, public resources and other ethical matters. The Secretaries Generals felt that corruption needs to be uprooted from both the Party and Government in order to safeguard the revolutionary Parties. It was observed that Former Liberation Movements share the same historical backgrounds where they entered government with nothing but suddenly some have become very wealthy while the people who elected them into office still languish in poverty. This creates resentment against the Party and its leadership leading to voter apathy or growing support for the opposition Parties.

- 3.1.2 **Weak Internal Democratic Practices.** The Secretaries General acknowledged that Former Liberation Movements

faced similar challenges with regards to conducting credible, free and fair internal elections to choose Party leaders as well as candidates to represent their Parties in National and Local Government Elections. A new breed of young upwardly mobile Party members, ever in a hurry to occupy senior leadership positions, is filling party ranks. This group is impatient and unwilling to understudy experienced office bearers. They can even use money to acquire top Party positions. This has introduced new dirty campaign strategies in internal Party elections characterised by vote buying, intimidation, violence, rigging and imposition of candidates. A new phenomenon where voters also demand payment in exchange for their votes is also a matter of great concern. Internal Party elections leave the membership deeply divided. This huge appetite for money and power and employment of dirty tactics in internal party elections create room for infiltration within Former Liberation Movements by former colonial power. Other negative consequences include selection of inexperienced, weak, ideologically bankrupt leaders on factional basis and in the same process eliminating experienced, well tried and tested cadres still in their prime and exhibiting exceptional leadership qualities for the simple reason that they belong to the wrong faction. This leaves Political Parties weakened and, consequently, it also weakens the Government creating, in the process, conducive conditions for voter dissatisfaction and defection to other Parties. Most importantly, this also contributes to the loss of ideological direction and the emergence of a systematic effort to eliminate the ethos of the Liberation Struggle as seen in the deliberate and targeted removal of War Veterans from leadership positions in all Former Liberation Movements Political Parties.

- 3.1.3 Secretaries General also acknowledged the adverse effects of climate change, particularly in Namibia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa, which are experiencing severe

drought. Inclement weather conditions are threatening food security, destroying livestock, flora and fauna. The workshop took special note of damage resulting from weather extremes in Angola, where in the north heavy rains caused extensive damage while the south has experienced severe draught. Whereas national governments in the affected countries have mobilised resources for humanitarian intervention in partnership with international donor agencies, this is also giving room for donor agencies to penetrate and infiltrate ruling Party strongholds where they spread pernicious opposition politics which promote regime change. These sinister efforts can be easily curtailed through the involvement of Party functionaries in the food distribution processes and control of the information cycle.

3.1.4 **Constitutional Presidential Term Limits.** Secretaries General cited the repeated calls and pressure from the donor community for African Governments in general and Former Liberation Movements, in particular, to legislate for Presidential terms of office to be limited to two five year terms as a precondition for giving aid as gross interference in the internal affairs of sovereign independent African States. The meeting acknowledged that while term limits could promote patience amongst aspiring successors they were directed to weaker nations while there are no such limits in countries such as the United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark, to name but a few examples. Secretaries General argued that imposing such demands on all nations was in total disregard of the prevailing national aspirations and constitutional provisions which could cause violent confrontations as was the case in Burundi.

3.1.5 **Urban Voter Apathy.** Party reports also noted the high unemployment, poor service delivery and poor infrastructure as the main factors that alienate urban voters from the governing Liberation Movements. Easy access to media mouth

pieces and social media makes urban voters targets for repeated bombardment by opposition propaganda crafted to make them loathe ruling Former Liberation Movements. Urban voters become the springboard from which opposition parties make spirited attempts not only to penetrate hitherto traditional rural strongholds of Former Liberation Movements and, more importantly, as the launch pad of Colour Revolutions in societies which are largely urbanised and semi-industrialised.

- 3.1.6 **The Generation Gap.** Secretaries General agreed that Youth participation in politics is a fundamental ingredient of organisational vibrancy. Historically, it is this particular age group (14 – 35) that were at the fore front of the Liberation Struggle, where the average age of the fighters at the height of the war was 16 - 20 years old. Today, similarly, this is the group that produces first time voters and are the highest potential voters in election. Secretaries General acknowledged that failure to capture this group, has direct impact not only on the size and quality of Party membership but equally in determining Party performance in elections. Secretaries General, further, observed that a new trend is emerging whereby youths of an elitist and materialist disposition, driven more by privileged parentage and high level political connections rather than a spirit of belonging, sacrifice, resilience or ideological affinity to the Party, are easily ascending to dominate the leadership of the Youth Leagues of Former Liberation Movements. In the case of South Africa, they have formed their own political party which is drawing a following from the poor who find their rhetoric of overnight radical change appealing. In Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe there are growing divisions between those that fought in the liberation struggle, senior Party leadership and young people. In Zimbabwe, a dominant group of youths of this warped orientation recently even challenged and dared the War

Veterans to an open fist fight, including armed conflict, thus epitomising a growing sentiment that seeks to eliminate the ethos of the Liberation Struggle and all people that hail from that era from the Party. This generation disconnect is further compounded by rising unemployment amongst the youth and lack of empowerment opportunities which leave young people highly agitated and easily enticed to confront leadership with demands for immediate solutions. The born free generation in general finds no reason to associate with the ethos of the Liberation Struggle. The workshop also took note of a negative phenomenon where people who benefited from the revolutionary changes that were introduced by the Former Liberation Movements are not generally joining, supporting or voting for them.

3.1.7 **Ideological Bankruptcy and Indiscipline.** Secretaries General observed growing indiscipline, insubordination, open defiance of Party rules and regulations and a general lack of ideological grounding amongst youths and other new Party members. In all the Former Liberation Movements, Youths are exhibiting indiscipline of the highest magnitude to the point where the Parties now doubt their loyalty. Quite often, the youths have been observed to act in spectacularly confident ignorance to their Parties' history, organisational culture and ideology.

3.1.8 **Hostile Media and Perception Management.** The Secretaries General acknowledged the regime change associated phenomenon of using and manipulating the media against governing Former Liberation Movements. Hostile media have perfected the art of packaging any shortcomings of Former Liberation Movement governments, whether real or contrived, around allegations of failure to uphold rule of law, press freedom, democratic values and other basic freedoms. The objective of such media campaigns is to demonise, stigmatise and criminalise governing former liberation movements and

create a hype, drama and uncertainty about the future. This, they know, agitates the electorate and destabilises the status quo of the Former Liberation Movements. In Southern Africa, the West has bankrolled anti-government media houses and initiatives such as International Media Support (IMS), George Soros' Open Society Initiative of Southern Africa (OSISA) and the Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA). It is incontestable that the majority of private newspapers and radio stations in member countries are vehemently anti-Former Liberation Movements.

3.1.9 **Incessant Contestation of Election Results.** Virtually all the Former Liberation Movements highlighted the increasing prevalence of contestation of elections by opposition formations with the support of NGOs and their Western sponsors. In the event that this fails, an alternative strategy of prejudging the soundness of electoral processes and systems claiming that they are likely to yield unfree and unfair results would have been put in motion. The aim is to discredit, delegitimise and overturn any electoral victory by Former Liberation Movements. The resultant uncertainty then becomes one of the primary ingredients for triggering colour revolutions or foisting inclusive unity governments.

3.1.10 **Personality Cult Syndrome** Secretaries General discouraged Former Liberation Movements from anchoring their political fortunes in a single person. Instead, they must anchor their fortunes on sound Party ideology and policies. Hero worshipping leaders tends to create a false impression that personalities are bigger than the Party and, therefore, indispensable making it difficult to manage organisational renewal and continuity mechanisms.

3.1.11 **Class Structure as a Motive Force.** The meeting highlighted the need for each Former Liberation Movement to take stock and understand in detail all the social classes that exist in the

political environment that they operate in. This is intended to assist them in assessing the needs of the electorate and designing winning strategies.

- 3.1.12 **Remnants of Apartheid and Racism.** The Secretaries General acknowledged this as a lingering threat specific to Namibia and South Africa. This manifests in the continuing domination of the economy and means of production by white males. This is particularly more pronounced in South Africa where it is a reminder of the distance ahead in the building of a truly rainbow nation. The two countries cannot stand solely on the good intentions of their leaders without addressing the racial and class question that continues to underpin their societal relations. Both are still home to racially organised and defined communities who live in distinct and separate geographic space. The townships are a home to Africans, exclusive up market suburbs are largely white. There is fundamentally a class factor to capitalist relations. White monopoly capital has demonstrated that it can tolerate and adapt to change as long as the fundamentals of its accumulation model are not tampered with. Since Southern Africa's capitalism developed as part of the West's imperialist expansion and conquest, the white community can always count on the support and protection of the world's mighty and powerful when and where necessary. These antagonistic relations are bound to explode as the black majority begins to question the benefit of their freedom and independence and when all privileges and wealth are still in the hands of the minority white colonisers. In South Africa, the white numerical minority continues to enjoy the power of a cultural majority due to its grip on the economy.

- 3.1.13 **Unmanaged or Accidental Leadership Transition.** The workshop expressed concern over the possibility of unmanaged or accidental leadership transitions happening in

member countries. The Secretaries General, instead, encouraged the Former Liberation Movements to have a common standard and practice of deliberate and planned leadership renewal and continuity. In this regard, they took note of the Chinese example where at every elective Congress of the Community Party of China 30% of the old guard, however selected, gives way to new blood. This ensures a 70% leadership continuity ratio. They congratulated FRELIMO for having already adopted 60% continuity and 40% renovation ratio. FRELIMO even goes further to divide the renovation ratio, through a provision in the Party Constitution, reserving 10% of members for War Veterans, 35% women and 15% youths. The workshop saw the FRELIMO model as a good starting point as a standard.

4.0 **Recommendations.**

4.1 The Secretaries General made the following recommendations:

- 4.1.1 For the Former Liberation Movements to institute tough disciplinary measures, along with strong ideological grounding, targeting the youth, new members and errant members and leaders, under the auspices of Political Party Ideological Schools and National Youth Service Programmes.
- 4.1.2 For the Former Liberation Movements to apply innovative, streetwise media and information strategies which make full use of available technological advances.
- 4.1.3 For the Former Liberation Movements to avoid cultivating personality cults as a bases for their political fortunes and, instead, to revert to a culture of respecting their ideology.
- 4.1.4 For the Former Liberation Movements to urgently institute measures to eliminate the use of money, other material

enticements and slate based factional candidature in influencing outcomes of internal electoral processes.

- 4.1.5 For the Former Liberation Movements, individually and through exchanges, to carry out focused political orientation programmes for youths, both who are members and non-members of their parties, as the primary way of closing the generation gap and inculcating correct ideologies and a sense of belong in them.
- 4.1.6 For the Former Liberation Movements to establish a standing mechanism for the regular, timely and continuous sharing of intelligence on regime change machinations as well as mobilisation, campaigning and election management methodologies. This may be fashioned as a series of resident Early Warning Centres stationed at each Party Headquarters and headed by high ranking Country Point Persons as a way of confronting comprehensively and proactively the threat of regime change.
- 4.1.7 For the Former Liberation Movements to expedite the construction and operationalization of the long mooted Joint Regional School of Ideology.
- 4.1.8 For the Former Liberation Movements to institute or improve existing measures, including legislative ones, to recognise, respect, honour, economically empower, meet the social needs and mainstream their War Veterans, Women and well-groomed youths into their Party and national political and socio-economic processes.
- 4.1.9 For the Former Liberation Movements to establish a daily newspaper, a radio station, a dedicated presence on television either by owning a station or hiring space in an existing station,

as well as establishing and maintaining a meaningful interactive presence on the internet and the social networks.

- 4.1.10 For the Former Liberation Movements There is need however for the political parties to study the shift in the weather patterns in order to realign the agricultural seasons to the prevailing weather patterns.
- 4.1.11 For the Former Liberation Movements to share experiences and institute joint and individual measures to eliminate corruption, particularly that which involves corporate and state capture in governance.
- 4.1.12 For the Former Liberation Movements to consider adopting a standard leadership renewal and continuity ratio of 70% continuity with 30% renewal.
- 4.1.13 For the Former Liberation Movements to consider holding other workshops to share experiences and craft joint strategies in the other pillars of national security, such as sustainable economic revival and growth.
- 4.1.14 For the Liberation Movements to exchange experiences and ideas on sustainably resourcing, both financially and materially, their political activities.
- 4.1.15 For the Liberation Movements to consider establishing dedicated think tanks on their Party structures to be charged with researching and designing scientific approaches to strategic planning and operational execution of their programme and policies.
- 4.1.16 For the Former Liberation Movements to craft and implement innovative streetwise strategies for recapturing and sustainably retaining the support of beneficiaries of revolutionary change who generally do not support or vote for them.